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4. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO HEAR THIS MATTER: 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code, Section 78-2-2, and authority to assign 
this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code, Section 
78-2-2(4). This Court received this case by transfer from the 
Supreme Court on November 28, 1994, and has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
5. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL: 
The issues raised in this appeal are as follows: 
A. Whether the lower court erred by allowing Defendant to 
conduct discovery after it had cut off all discovery by its prior 
orders? 
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate 
Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based 
upon an abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court determines for 
itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does 
not defer in any degree to the trial judge7s determination of 
law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State 
v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
B. Whether Appellant is allowed an additional three (3) 
days to file its answers to discovery requests pursuant to Rule 6 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, its answers 
on April 25, 1994, were timely? 
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate 
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Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based 
upon an abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court determines for 
itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does 
not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State 
v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
C. Whether Appellant is allowed an additional five (5) days 
to file an answer pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-504 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration and therefore his answers of 
April 25, 1994, were timely? 
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate 
Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based 
upon an abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court determines for 
itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does 
not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State 
v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
D. Should Appellant be relieved from any obligation to file 
answers to the April 12, 1994 Order because it was not served 
upon Appellant? 
The standard of review on this issue is: The Appellate 
Court reviews the decision for its correctness, and not based 
upon an abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court determines for 
itself the proper outcome based on the applicable Rule and does 
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not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), citing State 
v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993), and Kennecott Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
E. Assuming, arguendo, all of the actions of the lower 
Court were proper in entering an order of dismissal under the 
relevant rules, should Appellant be relieved of the onerous 
sanction of dismissal when he was unaware of the order requiring 
an earlier delivery and his answers to discovery were delivered 
one business day late? 
The standard of review on this issue is: The lower Court's 
decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce, 
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), Bovce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 
1980), Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976). 
F. Whether, under the circumstances, Defendant should be 
entitled to any sanctions, including the award of $250.00 in 
attorney's fees? 
The standard of review on this issue is: The lower Court's 
decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce, 
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), Boyce v. Bovce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 
1980), Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976). 
6. STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL: 
The Rules applicable to this appeal are as follows: 
Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Additional time for service by mail. Whenever a party has 
the right or is required to do some act or take some 
proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of 
a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is 
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served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period, (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration: 
Copies of the proposed findings, judgements, and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented 
to the court for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the 
court and counsel within five days after service. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration: 
[Copy of this rule is contained in an addendum in this brief 
pursuant to Rule 24(f) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] 
Rule 26(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Discovery conference. At any time after commencement of an 
action, the court may direct the attorneys for the parties 
to appear before it in a conference on the subject of 
discovery. The court shall do so upon motion by the 
attorney for any party if the motion includes: 
(1) a statement of the issues as they then appear; 
(2) a proposed plan and schedule for discovery; 
(3) any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery; 
(4) any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; 
and 
(5) a statement showing that the attorney making the motion 
has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with 
opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the motion. 
Each party and his attorney are under a duty to participate 
in good faith in the framing of a discovery plan if a plan 
is proposed by the attorney for any party. Notice of the 
motion shall be served on all parties. Objections or 
additions to matters set forth in the motion shall be served 
not later than ten days after service of the motion. 
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an 
order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery 
purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, 
setting limitations on discovery, if any, and determining 
such other matters, including the allocation of expenses, as 
are necessary for the proper management of discovery in the 
action. An order may be altered or amended whenever justice 
so requires. 
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a 
discovery conference with a prompt convening of the 
conference, the court may combine the discovery conference 
with a pretrial conference authorized by Rule 6. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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7. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
This is an appeal from an Order Dismissing with prejudice a 
personal injury law suit brought by Appellant in the Fourth 
District Court for the State of Utah based upon the Appellant's 
alleged failure to comply with a discovery order. (See Order of 
Dismissal dated April 28, 1994, in the Record at Page 229.) In 
the brief of Appellant, the Record shall be referred to as 
follows: "R. at p.—".) The facts relevant to this proceeding 
are as follows: 
FACTS 
1. Appellant, William Morton, is a 56-year-old male truck 
driver who was permanently and totally disabled by a vehicle 
accident which occurred on April 29, 1989. (See Complaint, R. at 
p. 3 - 1.) Appellant is commonly referred to as "Woody" Morton. 
He timely filed suit and prosecuted the action in the District 
Court, among other things, hired experts who were deposed by the 
Defendant. The parties both cooperated in discovery while the 
case was pending in the Fourth District Court and there was only 
one motion filed by either party which dealt with discovery. (R. 
at p. 137.) 
2. That single motion was filed after the case had been 
pending for more than three (3) years with numerous depositions, 
interrogatories, and documents having been produced. (See court 
file referencing Depositions of William Morton (See R. at p. 
20.), Rudolph Limpert (See R. at p. 31 and 36.), Donald Remington 
(See R. at p. 25, 29 and 34.), Dr. Philip Hoyt (See R. at p. 66 
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and 80.)/ Newell Knight (See R. at p. 45 and 56.), Greg Duval 
(See R. at p. 80 and 82.), and Steven Pelton (R. at p. 23 and 
27) . 
3. The Fourth District Court entered a "Minute 
Entry/Pretrial Conference Trial Setting" on May 8, 1992, which 
ordered that discovery be completed by October 30, 1992. (See 
Minute Entry, R. at p. 32.) Subsequently, at the request of both 
parties, the trial was continued until January 11, 1994. A 
scheduling order was entered in May of 1993 which established a 
discovery cut-off date of December 8, 1993. (See Scheduling 
Order, R. at p. 73.) 
4. In accordance with this schedule, Appellant Woody 
Morton and Defendant each prepared and submitted witness and 
exhibit lists, jointly signed and submitted a pretrial order, and 
exchanged trial exhibits in December of 1993. (See Pretrial 
Order, R. at p. 120 - 110.) 
5. Just before the trial was scheduled to commence in 
January of 1994, Defendant requested the trial be continued and 
Appellant Woody Morton did not oppose the request. Although the 
trial was continued, discovery had been cut off on December 8, 
1993 by order of the Fourth District Court. No scheduling order 
was entered, nor any other order entered which allowed Defendant 
to continue taking discovery. (See Minute Entry, R. at p. 107.) 
A day later, the District Court signed a Pretrial Order. This 
Order had signatures from Appellants counsel and Defendant's 
counsel. This Order, submitted to the court and entered January 
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11, 1994, stated: "Discovery has been completed." (R. at p. 
110.) 
6. Although discovery was not permitted, Defendant 
propounded interrogatories and request for production of 
documents on January 14, 1994. While Appellant Woody Morton was 
under no obligation to do so, he undertook to answer the 
discovery requests by again interviewing witnesses listed on both 
Appellant's and Defendant's witness lists in the Pretrial Order. 
(See Certificate of Service, R. at p. 133; Request for Production 
of Documents, R. at p. 142-140; and Interrogatories, R. at p. 
156 - 143.) 
7. In addition to the witnesses previously identified as 
witnesses for both parties, Appellant was also able to interview 
a witness named Marvin Ainge. Although Mr. Ainge was identified 
in discovery as a potential witness, he had never been located 
for an interview. Mr. Ainge was a truck driver who arrived at 
the scene of the accident immediately after it occurred in April 
of 1989. He is a truck driver whose vocation regularly takes him 
outside Utah. (R. at p. 433.) 
8. Mr. Ainge was unavailable to meet and be interviewed 
until Saturday April 9, 1994. He was recorded at Woody Morton's 
counsel's office on that Saturday, and the transcript was 
prepared of that interview Thursday April 14, 1994 and mailed to 
him for his review, approval, and signing on April 15, 1994. Mr. 
Ainge returned the signed statement on May 6, 1994. (R. at p. 
433 and 474.) 
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9. Defendant filed a Motion to Compel answers to discovery 
requests, (See R. at p. 137.) On April 12, 1994 the Fourth 
District Court contacted counsel for Defendant ex parte and 
requested Defendant prepare an order which gave Appellant Woody 
Morton ten (10) days to answer the discovery requests and which 
threatened to dismiss the Appellant's complaint unless the 
answers were produced within ten (10) days. The lower Judge 
admits the ex parte communication in his Memorandum Decision of 
August 29, 1994. (See Order, R. at p. 164; Memorandum, R. at p. 
376; and Memorandum Decision, paragraph 6, R. at p. 483.) When 
the lower Court called Defendant's counsel, Woody Morton's 
counsel was not included, and therefore did not know of the 
conversation or of the Order to be entered pursuant to the 
conversation. 
10. Defendant prepared such an order the same day, April 
12, 1994, and hand carried it to the Judge of the Fourth District 
Court on that same day. Also on the same day the District Court 
Judge signed the Order and the clerk entered the Order. (See 
Order, R. at 164; and Memorandum, R. at p.376.) 
11. Defendant alleges it "mailed" a copy of the Order to 
Appellant on that same date. Appellant has no record of 
receiving such an order. (See Affidavits of Denver C. Snuffer, 
Jr., R. at p. 388 - 386; and Brenda Welch, R. at p. 385 - 382 and 
490 - 488.) 
12. The legal secretary responsible for opening mail and 
routing it to counsel as well as Woody Morton's counsel submitted 
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affidavits to the Court below attesting the Order was not 
received. (Id.) 
13. Without knowing an order was entered compelling answers 
to be produced, Appellant finalized its answers to the discovery 
requests on approximately April 18, 1994. However, Woody Morton 
was in the hospital because of an emergency appendectomy at the 
time the answers were finalized and was unavailable to sign the 
answers. (Id.) 
14. Woody Morton was available to sign the answers on April 
21, 1994. However, since he was unaware of any order requiring 
the answers to be delivered, his answers were not delivered until 
Monday, April 25, 1994. (Id.) 
15. Defendant filed a motion on April 25, 1994, asking for 
dismissal of Woody Morton's complaint with prejudice. No reply 
to the motion was permitted (cf. with CJA Rule 4-501(1)(b)) and a 
dismissal was entered three (3) days later based on the motion. 
(R. at p. 215, 229.) Although Defendant alleges it had "mailed" 
a copy of the April 12, Order on April 12, 1994, and although 
Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows three (3) days 
to Appellant because of mailing, Defendant nonetheless insisted 
the answers came due on Friday, April 22, 1994, and they were 
delinquent when received on Monday, April 25, 1994. (See R. at p. 
376 - 374.) If three days are added, the answers were due the 
day they were received. The Motion asking for dismissal of 
Appellant's complaint does not mention answers had been received. 
16. The Court and counsel for Defendant ignored the 
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requirements of Rule 4-504 (2), which allowed five days after the 
submission of a proposed form of order for Appellant to object 
before its entry. Under the provisions of either Rule 6 of the 
Utah Civil Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 4-504 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, the answers filed by Appellant Woody 
Morton on Monday April 25, 1994 were timely. 
17. Defendant alleges it delivered a copy of its April 25th 
Motion to Enter an Order of Dismissal to Appellant. Appellant 
has no record of ever receiving such a motion. Again, affidavits 
from a legal secretary and counsel attested to this. (See R. at 
p. 388 - 382 and 490 - 488.) 
18. Notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 4-501 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration, which allows Appellant ten (10) 
days after service of a motion to file an opposition memorandum, 
the Court entered an Order of Dismissal on April 28, 1994, three 
(3) days after the motion was filed. (See R. at p. 229.) 
19. On May 9, 1994, Appellant, for the first time, was 
notified of the Orders of April 12th and 28th. (See R. at p. 
247.) 
20. Appellant immediately filed a series of motions seeking 
relief including a Motion for Relief from Judgment (See R. at p. 
249 - 233.), Motion to Set Aside Judgment (See R. at p. 405 -
400.), Motion to Strike Order of April 12 (See R. at p. 449 -
452.), and Motion to Strike Order of April 28, 1994. (See R. at 
p. 447 - 442.) On June 14th, the Court below extended time to 
appeal this matter until 30 days following its ruling on these 
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motions pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. (See R. at p. 407.) 
21. On September 22, 1994 the Court denied all of 
Appellant's motions. The Court also sanctioned Appellant with 
attorneys' fees to Defendant of $250.00. The Court mentioned, 
for the first time, retroactively, that Defendant was given more 
"time" for discovery by the continuance in January. (R. at p. 
484.) This matter then became final and appealable, and 
Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. (See R. at p. 498, 
496.) 
8. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS: 
A. The lower Court erred by allowing Defendant to conduct 
discovery after it had Ordered an end to discovery. A Scheduling 
Order cut off discovery in December 1993. The Minute Entry 
continuing the case on January 10, 1994 does not reopen 
discovery. The Pretrial Order signed by the Court and 
Defendant's counsel on January 11, 1994 states "Discovery has 
been concluded." It was an error to enter a Dismissal of the 
case based on failure to answer discovery when discovery was no 
longer permitted. 
B. Defendant alleges it "mailed" notice of an Order 
requiring answers within 10 days. Assuming the notice was 
actually mailed (Appellant has no record of it ever being 
received), Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows an 
additional three (3) days for answers. The lower Court did not 
allow these additional days. If they had, the answers of Woody 
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Morton were timely. It was an error to not allow this additional 
time. 
C. Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
required Defendant to submit its Order to Appellant for review 
before submitting it to the Court. Appellant had five (5) days 
to review and approve the proposed order. Although the order was 
not submitted to Appellant, the five days allowed for objection 
should be added to the time for his answer under the Order. If 
the five days are added, his answers were early and it was an 
error to dismiss the case. 
D. Appellant has no record of receiving the Order of April 
12, 1994. The Defendant alleges it "mailed" a copy of the Order. 
In three affidavits below, Appellant testified he was unaware of 
the Order. Under these circumstances, an answer that is only one 
business day late should be excused. 
E. Assuming all actions of the lower Court were 
procedurally correct, equity and fairness require a reversal of 
the dismissal of the case. This was the only motion dealing with 
discovery filed by either party below. Under Defendant's theory, 
the answers were one business day late. The dismissal was too 
harsh a remedy to impose. Answers were merely a courtesy, since 
discovery was not permitted by prior Order of the Court, and 
therefore dismissal for failure to participate in prohibited 
discovery is a manifest unjust result. 
F. Under the circumstances of this case, no sanctions were 
proper. The award of attorney's fees was also inappropriate and 
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should be reversed. 
9. ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT IN SUPPORT OF THIS APPEAL: 
BACKGROUND 
The lower court seemed to fault Appellant for the length of 
time this case had been pending below. However, Woody Morton had 
diligently prosecuted the case for over three years. 
Initially, he was undergoing repeated major surgeries to 
correct injuries from the accident involved in this case. In one 
instance trial was continued to allow Woody to undergo another 
knee replacement surgery. (R. at p. 59, 63.) It was also 
continued once by the Court below due to its scheduling. The 
final continuance was at the request of Defendant. 
Prior to the case being filed, the insurance company, on 
behalf of Defendant, Continental Baking Company, had an 
investigating adjuster. Continental Baking Company, its 
insurance adjuster, counsel for Defendant, as well as Woody 
Mortons counsel, exchanged, voluntarily and cooperatively, all 
of the physical evidence in this case. Most of the exchange of 
evidence took place before the lawsuit was filed. 
The physical evidence consisted primarily of a series of 
photographs taken at the scene of the accident by the Utah 
Department of Transportation. There was a video tape made of 
scene of the accident by the Utah Department of Transportation. 
Although the Utah Highway Patrol took some photographs of the 
scene, their photographs were not or could not be developed and 
were therefore unavailable to either party. The investigating 
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officer at the accident scene prepared field notes and a report 
on the accident. Prior to the lawsuit being filed both parties 
had all the Department of Transportations photographs, the 
police investigation report, field notes of the investigating 
officer, and the video made by the Department of Transportation. 
After the law suit was filed the investigating police 
officer was deposed. Defendant hired an expert accident 
reconstructionist named Rudolph Limpert. His deposition was 
taken. Appellant hired an accident investigation expert named 
Don Remington, whose deposition was taken. Mr. Morton also 
retained an expert due to a dispute over the location of a fuel 
spill shown in the photographs. This expert was Dr. Philip Hoyt. 
Dr. Hoyt is a neighbor of the Defense attorney, and is acquainted 
with Defendant's counsel personally and socially. Dr. Hoyt was 
deposed. Mr. Morton also hired Greg Duval as an accident 
reconstructionist. He was interviewed and recorded by Defendant. 
Before the lawsuit was filed, Woody Morton was interviewed 
by the insurance adjuster for Continental Baking Company and the 
interview was recorded. After the lawsuit, Mr. Morton was 
deposed and the recorded statement taken by the adjuster was made 
an exhibit to his deposition. 
Over the course of several days of final trial preparation, 
Dr. Hoyt noticed skid marks in the photographs and video tapes in 
close proximity to the accident which he believed had a bearing 
on the reconstruction of the accident. The police officer 
testified in his deposition these skid marks were unrelated to 
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the accident. After carefully reviewing the photographs and 
video tape for several hours Dr. Hoyt had the conviction that 
skid-marks appearing in the photographs and video tape had to 
originate from Woody Morton's vehicle. When he reached this 
conclusion, Appellant's counsel telephoned Defendant's counsel on 
a speaker phone. Defense counsel was allowed to interview Dr. 
Hoyt regarding what he saw in the photographs and his view of the 
way in which the accident unfolded. There were no new 
photographs or video tapes being used. This was the same video 
tape which both parties had in their possession prior to and 
throughout the time the lawsuit had been pending. Defense 
counsel recognized the information in the photographs to which 
Dr. Hoyt made reference. 
Because Defendant's counsel believed he needed more time to 
prepare as a result of this new theory, he asked for a 
continuance of the trial. Appellant did not object. The 
primary purpose of the continuance, as Appellant's counsel 
understood it, was to give Defendant time to prepare for the 
additional theory. Defendant was to review the new theory with 
his own accident reconstructionist. For this, no discovery was 
needed and the requests propounded by Defendant were superfluous. 
Dr. Hoyt's theory of the skid-marks was his opinion based 
upon photographs and video tapes. The theory would be greatly 
strengthened if the truck driver who arrived first at the scene 
from the same direction Woody Morton was traveling could be 
contacted and interviewed. Although the parties knew this 
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individual's name, Marvin Ainge, he had not been interviewed by 
Appellant. Mr. Ainge was previously identified in discovery as a 
potential witness. He could have been contacted by either party 
and interviewed. In checking Appellant's files, letters had been 
sent to Mr. Ainge and efforts had been made to interview him for 
several years without success. After the continuance, in an 
effort to bolster the opinion of Dr. Hoyt, Appellant renewed his 
effort to contact Mr. Ainge. 
Mr. Ainge was a truck driver who was out of the State of 
Utah regularly with his employment. Although renewed efforts to 
contact him began in January, he was unavailable until Saturday, 
April 9, 1994, for Appellant to interview. Appellant does not 
know if Mr. Ainge was interviewed by Defendant before or since 
then. He was certainly as available to Defendant to interview as 
he was to Appellant. In fact, given Defendant's resources and 
the resources of its insurance company, it was in a better 
position to investigate and locate witnesses than Woody Morton. 
Defendant's insurance carrier had aggressively investigated the 
accident. They had even interviewed Woody Morton while he was in 
a hospital bed eight (8) days after the accident. Mr. Ainge was, 
in any case, not a surprise witness. 
Appellant received discovery requests from Defendant in 
January of 1994. This was after discovery had been cut off by a 
prior Scheduling Order and by the Pretrial Order. Appellant did 
not object to answering the untimely discovery requests, but an 
objection is not required to untimely discovery. As a matter of 
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courtesy, Woody intended to answer the discovery. The quality of 
the information requested in the untimely discovery would be 
greatly improved if Mr. Ainge could be interviewed before the 
answers were supplied. Therefore, Appellant's counsel 
concentrated his efforts on getting Mr. Ainge interviewed and 
providing input from Mr. Ainge in the answers. 
When Mr. Ainge was interviewed April 9, 1994, he was able to 
tell from the photographic evidence and video tape the skid-marks 
in close proximity to the accident were not created by his 
vehicle. Mr. Ainge consented to make a statement, which he 
allowed to be recorded as part of the interview. He was tape 
recorded as part of the interview. 
A written transcript of Mr. Ainge's interview was completed 
on Thursday, April 14, 1994, and mailed to Mr. Ainge for his 
review, approval, and signing on April 15, 1994. He did not 
return the signed statement until May 6, 1994. However, the 
information he made available was incorporated into the Woody's 
answers to discovery, and those answers were completed on April 
18, 1994. 
Woody Morton was contacted by his counsel and asked to sign 
the answers to discovery on approximately April 18th. However, 
Woody was hospitalized for an emergency appendectomy and was 
unavailable to sign until his release from the hospital. He 
signed the answers on April 21, 1994. Appellant was unaware of 
any court imposed deadline and unaware answers were due at any 
set time. In spite of the fact Appellant was unaware of any 
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deadline, answers were received by Defendant on Monday, April 25, 
1994. 
All of the proceedings below were based solely upon the 
failure to provide the answers on Friday, April 22, 1994. Those 
answers could have been mailed on Friday and would not have 
arrived until Monday the 25th or thereafter, and still have been 
timely under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The case was scheduled for trial in August, 1994. Answers 
delivered on Friday, April 22, or on Monday, April 25, would not 
in any way prejudice Defendant's preparation for trial in August. 
Further, the information about the new theory had been discussed 
fully by defense counsel with the witness testifying to the 
theory in a phone conference before the continuance was granted. 
Defendant was fully able to prepare its own expert witness with 
the information already provided prior to the continuance. To 
the extent Defendant wanted to interview Mr. Ainge, they had his 
name and the resources to contact him. The Defendant did not 
need more time for Woody Morton to interview known witnesses and 
report findings to them. 
A. The District Court erred by Allowing Defendant to Conduct 
Discovery After it had Cut Off Discovery by its Prior Orders, 
The District Court erred by allowing Defendant to conduct 
discovery after it had cut off discovery by its prior Scheduling 
Order. Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the 
District Court to enter a discovery order "establishing a plan 
and schedule for discovery..." The court cannot enter such an 
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order and then disregard it. Until the continuance of the trial 
in January, 1994, there had always been compliance with the 
Court's Scheduling Orders by the Court and the parties. There 
was a violation of that Order when Defendant propounded discovery 
requests on January 14, 1994. Defendant should not be entitled 
to ignore the Scheduling Order and then receive a dismissal 
against Woody Morton on the basis of Defendant's violation of 
that Order. If Defendant wanted further discovery, it should 
have asked to reopen discovery. 
There was no order reopening discovery. The Minute Entry of 
January 10, 1994 which continued the case makes no reference to 
reopening discovery. (R. at p. 107) This is the document of the 
Court entered contemporaneous with the continuance. A day later, 
the Court signed a Pretrial Order. This Order also has the 
signatures of Defendant's attorney and Mr. Morton's attorney. 
This Pretrial Order states: "Discovery has been completed." (R. 
at p. 110) 
In contrast to the Orders at the time of the continuance, 
months later the lower Court wrote it "reset the trial in order 
to give the Defendant time for discovery." (Emphasis Added. 
See, Memorandum Decision, R. at p. 484) This does not mean, 
however, Defendant did not need to move to reopen discovery. It 
does not follow that granting more time has the automatic effect 
of entering an order allowing discovery. The lower Court had 
previously always followed a practice of entering an Order 
outlining the discovery cutoff. (See, eg. Minute Entry, R. at p. 
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32; Scheduling Order, R. at p. 73.) In contrast to the Rules and 
established past practice, there is only passing mention, 
retroactively, in the final Memorandum Decision, that the Court 
wanted to give Defendant more "time" for discovery. Due Process 
requires notice in advance. 
If it was the Courts actual intent to reopen discovery, it 
should have followed the Rules and its prior practice. Reopening 
of discovery is not mentioned in the Minute Entry of January 
10th. Discovery is prohibited by the Pretrial Order of January 
11th. This Pretrial Order could easily have been interlineated 
or amended by the Court if it really entertained the intent to 
reopen discovery. The Court had the responsibility to give Mr. 
Morton notice of that before the discovery was propounded, rather 
than telling him about it months after the fact. If it were 
actually the intent of the lower Court to reopen discovery, it 
could have been a great deal more clear on the matter. As the 
record stands, Defendant was not entitled to any further 
discovery. The answers given by Woody Morton were only a 
courtesy. His failure to tender the courtesy earlier is no 
reason to dismiss his case. 
B. Appellant was Allowed an Additional Three (3) Days to 
Answer under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
Therefore, the April 25, 1994 Answers were Timely. 
Assuming there was nothing improper about the 
discovery, Appellant is allowed an additional three (3) days to 
file his answers to discovery requests pursuant to Rule 6 of the 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Therefore, his answers on April 
25, 1994, were timely. Defendant alleges it "mailed" to 
Appellant a copy of the Order. Therefore, under Defendant's 
version of the events, by mailing the notice to Appellant, Rule 6 
added three days to the time requirements imposed by the Order. 
Once three days are added, the answers were not due until Monday, 
April 25, 1993. They were actually received at that time. 
There was a manifest error by the lower Court when it failed 
to allow Mr. Morton these additional three days when computing 
whether he complied with the Court's Order. The Order of 
Dismissal should, therefore, be reversed. 
It should be noted that if they had been mailed on Friday, 
and received on Monday they would have been timely even under 
Defendant's version of the facts and law. They were admittedly 
delivered on Monday. 
C. Appellant is Allowed an Additional Five (5) Days to 
Object Before the Entry of an Order Under Rule 4-504 of the Code 
of Judicial Administration, and Therefore the April 25* 1994 
Answers were Timely, 
Woody Morton should be allowed an additional five (5) 
days to file an answer under the April 12th Order pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Therefore, his answers of April 25, 1994, were timely. The ex 
parte communications between the court and Defendant's counsel 
which resulted in the April 12th order violated Rule 4-504. Mr. 
Morton should have been given five (5) days to object to the 
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proposed form of order before it was signed by the court. If 
this additional five day period is added to the time of the 
Order, the April 25th answers were two days early. For this 
reason, the lower Court should be reversed. 
D. Should Appellant be Relieved from any Responsibility to 
File Answers on April 22, 1994, Because the Order Requiring 
Answers on that Date was not Served Upon Him, 
Appellant should be relieved from any obligation to 
file answers to the April 12, 1994, Order because the Order was 
not served upon him. Appellant has no record of ever receiving 
the Order. Woody Morton filed answers as a courtesy on April 
25th without knowing they were due. Assuming he is not entitled 
to any additional time under the Order based on Rule 6 URCP or 
Rule 4-504, because he never received the Order of April 12th, he 
should be relieved from failing to comply with the Order. In any 
event, Mr. Morton missed compliance by at most only one business 
day of an Order kept secret from him. Under these circumstances, 
the lower Court should be reversed. 
Below, controlling weight was given to Certificates of 
Mailing and Delivery signed by Defendant. These Certificates 
alone were used to determine if Appellant received the documents 
in question, rather than a sworn affidavit of Woody Morton's 
counsel, and another two affidavits from a legal secretary who 
reviewed and calendared all incoming documents. 
Counsel for the Defendant is not above errors in mailing. 
In one instance, Defendants counsel mailed two copies of an 
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affidavit from one affiant, and failed to mail a copy of another 
affidavit from a different affiant. These were attached to 
motions made after the mailing certificates were drawn into 
question. (R. at p. 430.) Everyone makes a mistake on occasion. 
Here, the lower Court chose to deprive Woody Morton the 
opportunity to present the merits of his case based upon the 
presumed infallibility of the Defendant's mailing system and the 
U.S. Mail. That, too, while giving no weight to affidavits from 
an attorney and legal secretary who never received the documents. 
Appellant has no history of ignoring any court order. Mr. 
Morton would not have ignored the April 12th Order if it had been 
received. The answers were ready on Thursday. He would not have 
delivered the answers on Monday if he knew they were due on 
Friday. He was not aware of the Order, and for that reason alone 
did not meet the deadline. He should be relieved from the harsh 
consequences imposed by the lower Court. No litigant should lose 
his opportunity for a day in court because a document was not 
received by his counsel. 
It should be remembered the failure here is one within the 
control of the party benefiting from the failure. The Defendant 
failed to get a copy to Appellant. The Defendant did not call 
Appellant's counsel on the phone to alert him of the Order, 
although there was a good working relationship. That remains the 
greatest mystery to Appellant still. Appellant's counsel would 
not have sought a dismissal under the circumstances without first 
talking with the Defense attorney to confirm there was an 
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intentional abandonment of the case. Here, Defendant benefits 
from a dismissal on a technicality of procedure. None of the 
dispositive events were within the control of the Appellant or 
his counsel. Mr. Morton is the one burdened by the dismissal. 
It is fundamentally unfair to allow such inequities to remain. 
It is also curious the Court and Defendant's counsel talked 
about the April 12th Order ex parte and entered the Order the 
same day as the conversation. If Appellant's counsel had been 
included in that conversation, there would be no question 
Appellant would have learned of the Order. Once again, Woody 
Morton lost substantive legal rights below which could have 
easily been protected by the Court with little additional effort. 
This cries out for correction on appeal. 
E. Assuming the Lower Court Complied with all Procedural 
Requirements, the Order of Dismissal was Still Improper Because 
Appellant was Unaware of His Violation of any Order, and the 
Sanction of Dismissal is Too Harsh Under the Circumstances Here, 
Assuming, arguendo, all of the actions of the lower 
Court were proper in entering an order of dismissal under the 
relevant Rules of Procedure, Woody Morton should be relieved of 
the onerous sanction of dismissal. He was unaware of the order 
requiring an earlier delivery and his answers were delivered at 
the most one business day late. As the Appeals court stated in 
Parr inert on v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (1991): "...default judgment is 
an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out with 
caution." Id. at 456. The Supreme Court also looked at the 
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sanctions allowed under Rule 37 shortly after its revision in 
1972. The court explained sanctions by a lower court must fit 
within fundamental concern for fairness and meeting the ends of 
justice. The Court wrote: 
"It is true that where the authority to perform a 
proposed action rests within the discretion of the 
court we must allow considerable latitude in which he 
may exercise his judgment. But this does not mean that 
the court has unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary 
manner. Fundamental to the concept of the rule of law 
is the principle that reason and justice shall prevail 
over the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one 
person; and that this applies to all men in every 
status: to courts and judges, as well as to autocrats 
or bureaucrats. The meaning of the term "discretion" 
itself imports that the action should be taken within 
reason and good conscience in the interest of 
protecting the rights of both parties and serving the 
ends of justice. It has always been the policy of our 
law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to 
have their day in court of the merits of a 
controversy." Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 
(1976). 
The result here is fundamentally unfair. The parties have 
not had their day in court to resolve the matter on its merits. 
Reason and good conscience require the court below be reversed 
and this matter remanded for decision on its merits. 
This matter is now before the Appeals Court based solely on 
Defendant's allegation it delivered documents which Appellant has 
no record of receiving. Mr. Morton has verified the documents 
were not in his files by multiple affidavits. Even so, the 
answers were at the most one business day late under the 
Defendant's theory. Defendant's theory is also dependent upon 
ignoring various Rules of Civil Procedure and Judicial 
Administration. It requires the Court to believe Woody Morton, 
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after spending over 3 years of time and over $20,000.00 in costs 
prosecuting this case would violate an order by one day when he 
could have complied. This proposition makes no sense. If the 
Order had been given to him, he would have complied. It made no 
difference to Mr. Morton whether he delivered the signed answers 
on Thursday, the 21st of April, when signed, Friday, the 22nd, or 
on Monday, the 25th of April. Since the alleged deadline was 
Friday, with the potential for violation of an Order if it was 
not met, Mr. Morton would surely have complied if the Order had 
been given to him. The harsh result below is too inequitable to 
let stand. 
F. No Sanctions, Including Attorney's Fees, were Proper in 
This Case. 
Appellant will not reiterate the matters compelling relief 
again here. It is apparent, however, under the circumstances, 
Defendant should not be entitled to any sanctions including the 
award of $250.00 in attorneys' fees. 
10. CONCLUSION: 
Woody Morton was not required to answer discovery after 
December 1993. The discovery of January, 1994 was in violation 
of the Court's Scheduling Order and Pretrial Order. The Minute 
Entry continuing the case makes no mention of allowing further 
discovery. No dismissal should be based on a failure to answer 
inappropriate discovery. 
The answers on Monday, April 25th, were on time. Rule 6 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow an extra three days to 
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any deadline for mailing. Here, Defendant alleges he "mailed" a 
copy of the Order to Appellant. Once notice is served by mail, 
an additional three days is allowed by this rule. 
Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration allows 
five days for a party to review any order for approval before it 
is submitted to the Court for signing. That was not done. 
However, Mr. Morton should be given five additional days under 
this rule in computing whether the answers were due on Friday, 
April 22nd. When this additional time is taken into account, the 
answers were two days early when Defendant received them on 
Monday, April 25th. 
This situation is fraught with potentially disastrous 
consequences for litigators. If any plaintiff can lose her right 
to have her case decided on the merits by unknowingly missing a 
deadline by one day, justice will become an increasingly elusive 
goal. If a defendant can intentionally or negligently fail to 
deliver notice of an order to her opponent and secure a dismissal 
of her adversary's case, what is to prevent abuse? Under the 
facts most favorable to Defendant, Woody Morton missed a deadline 
by one day. Justice should prevent the harsh result of 
dismissing his case after years of diligent prosecution for the 
want of one business day. The lower court should be reversed and 
this case should be remanded to be decided oni its merits. 
DATED this / day of January, 199/5. 
^ 
Denyer^C. Snufferj 
27 ; 
Jr. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief was mailed, in accordance with 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, postage prepaid 
to: 
Mr. Terry Plant 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DATED this \ £/ 
& 
£^n 
S:\denver\mort.app 
of January, 1995. 
28 
1 1 . APPENDIX 
29 
Rule 4-501 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 892 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby desig-
nated as locations of trial courts of record: American Fork; Bountiful; Cedar 
City; Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton; Murray; Orem; Park City; Roosevelt; Roy; 
Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork; West Valley City. 
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial court of record of any 
subject matter jurisdiction may hold court in any location designated by this 
rule. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE 5. 
CIVIL PRACTICE. 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda 
and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on 
dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts 
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims de-
partment of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncon-
tested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other docu-
ments relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or 
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the 
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte appli-
cation is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall 
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is 
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party 
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for 
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule. 
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply 
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's 
memorandum. 
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day 
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to 
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in 
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit 
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all 
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parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authori-
ties in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions 
of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and author-
ities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a 
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those por-
tions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applica-
ble, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts 
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement 
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifi-
cally controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless 
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in para-
graphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at 
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition 
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the 
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive 
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has 
been authoritatively decided. 
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the 
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter 
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for 
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the 
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents sup-
porting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the 
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies 
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court. 
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties 
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed 
waived. 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days be-
fore the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after 
that date without leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause 
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case 
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal 
issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's 
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without 
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court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments 
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- the proposed order" following "supporting doc-
ment rewrote this rule to such an extent that a umentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made re-
detailed description is impracticable. lated stylistic changes and inserted "principal" 
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of in Subdivision (3Kb). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS should have been given ten days to respond, as 
When rule aDnlies prescribed by Subdivision (1Kb) of this rule 
wnen rme applies. Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct 
U t e d
- App. 1991). 
When rule applies. _. ,
 TT _ 
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection Cited m Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a (Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State 
separate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992» 
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery documents. 
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures within 30 days of trial. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Parties conducting discovery under Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure shall not file discovery requests with the clerk of the 
court, but shall file only the original certificate of service stating that the 
discovery requests have been served on the other parties and the date of 
service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the clerk of 
the court. 
(2) The party serving the discovery request shall retain the original with a 
copy of the proof of service affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery 
request and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party 
responding to the discovery request shall retain the original with a copy of the 
proof of service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses and the proof of 
service upon the opposing party or counsel. The discovery requests and re-
sponse shall not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the court on motion 
and notice and for good cause shown so orders. 
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance with a discovery request 
or a motion which relies upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the 
discovery request or response which is at issue in the motion. 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure shall not be 
filed with the clerk of the court except as provided in this Code or upon order 
of the court for good cause shown. 
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discovery proceedings in accor-
dance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including 
all responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the 
court no later than thirty (30) days before the date set for trial of the case. The 
right to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30) days before trial 
shall be within the discretion of the court. Motions to conduct discovery within 
thirty (30^ days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the 
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